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VOLUME 62 SUMMER 1988 NUMBER 4
THE COURTS' ENFORCEMENT OF THE
RULE OF LAWt
EDWARD D. RE*
I. INTRODUCTION
A presentation such as this may properly commence by refer-
ring to the enormous body of law that exists to govern the modern
administrative state. Indeed, there are many who decry the fact
that we have too many laws and are overregulated. Others may be-
lieve that we are grossly underregulated. Clearly, the adminstrative
process touches the life of every person, as there is little that one
may do without coming into contact with a government official or
administrative agency. Since the subject vitally affects the rights of
all persons, a discussion of judicial review in the modern admin-
strative state is both important and appropriate.
To introduce the theme of the role of the courts in giving ef-
fect to the rule of law, I should like to start with a brief aphorism
from the XII Tables of Rome, an early code of law that reflects
great wisdom. "Salus populi suprema lex"-"the welfare of the
people is the supreme law." With these four words, in 50 B.C.,
more than two thousand years ago, the Romans formulated the ul-
timate goal and purpose of law.'
t Copyright 1988 by Edward D. Re. This Article is based upon the Second Annual
Joseph Besky Memorial Lecture, delivered at Bent Hall, St. John's University, February
28, 1985.
Footnotes have been added by the members of the St. John's Law Review.
* Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade. B.S., LL.B., J.S.D., D. Ped.,
LL.D., D.H.L., D.C.S. Distinguished Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
' See generally Re, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law, 29 FORDHAM L.
REV. 447 (1961) [hereinafter Re, The Roman Contribution].
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II. MODERN GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Commencing with such a concise and precise formulation of
the fundamental goal of law, it is appropriate to begin by asking
why we find ourselves today in the process of verbal inundation by
boundless oceans of laws, rules, and regulations? A simple answer
is that the world today is far more complex, and that the govern-
ment does, and is expected to do, much more than even in the
recent past. We are far removed from the minimal role of govern-
ment that kept out invaders, and maintained peace and order at
home. Indeed, the number of civilians employed by the federal
government approaches the total number of citizens of the country
at the time the Constitution was drafted in 1787. We have gone
beyond the regulatory state to the benefactory state which pro-
vides a host of services, including those that formerly were clearly
regarded as proper functions for the church and other voluntary
institutions.
The moment citizens say "there ought to be a law," or "gov-
ernment should do this or that," we have expanded the role and
functions of government, thereby increasing administration and
bureaucracy. Seldom do we hear cries that government is doing too
much, or that there should be less government and less regulation.
Indeed, on those rare occasions when it is decided to deregulate an
industry or activity, citizens immediately start to complain that
they are being abused or mistreated, again reactivating the cycle
calling for laws to regulate and control.2
Hence, it can be expected that in the modern administrative
state, public officers and administrative agencies will continue to
affect vitally the lives of all persons on a daily basis. As a conse-
quence, it is clearly more realistic to concentrate upon the legal
controls, devices, or remedies that may be used to assure that pub-
lic officials act lawfully, and ensure that they do not deprive per-
sons of rights and privileges guaranteed under the Constitution.
Surely no one should quarrel with the notion that a lawful society
requires that all offices of government act lawfully, that is, within
the bounds of the law.3 In the modern administrative state this
2 See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (citizens' groups chal-
lenge FCC's deregulation of licensing requirements); Telecommunications Research & Ac-
tion Center v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (suit brought subsequent to FCC's elimi-
nation of certain regulatory policies).
' See, e.g., Proceedings of the Second Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of International Trade, The Rule of Law in International Trade (Oct. 23, 1985), re-
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means that administrators must act within the bounds of their del-
egated authority, and comply with all limitations upon the power
of government.
It is not questioned that powers to control the administration
of governmental functions are possessed by all three branches of
government. For example, the executive may appoint and remove
officials; the legislative branch may repeal or amend statutes; and
the judiciary may declare that an administrative agency has acted
unlawfully, and set aside illegal administrative action. This Article
will focus on judicial review of administrative action. Within cer-
tain legal bounds defined by justiciability, standing, and absten-
tion, persons aggrieved by governmental or administrative action
may resort to the courts to air their grievances or complaints.
III. JUDICIAL REvmw OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION
In our society, judicial review of administrative action has as-
sumed great importance and value. Since more and more persons
resort to the courts for a vindication of their rights, we find our-
selves in a period described as a litigation or due process explo-
sion.4 Although this explosion has caused serious backlogs in the
courts, it is important to note that it also manifests a confidence in
the courts as agencies of government. Many years ago, a scholar
wrote: "When a plain man who thinks that he has been wronged
by another declares that he 'will have the law on him,' it expresses
his conviction that he can get justice from the courts."' The
strength of this conviction has led Americans to accept with eager-
ness the principle that an independent judiciary is necessary to a
printed in 111 F.R.D. 503, 505 (1985).
In a democratic society, all officials and agents of government are expected to act
lawfully, that is, within the bounds of law. They must perform their duties within
the scope of their lawful authority, and must comply with all of the limitations
imposed by law upon their powers. This is the meaning and promise of the rule of
law.
Id.
, Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1268 (1975). Judge
Friendly stated that since 1970, a "due process explosion" has occurred with respect to exec-
utive and administrative action. Id.; see also Re, The Administration of Justice and the
Courts, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1984) (discussing the growing burden on courts as
citizens increasingly look to courts for redress of grievances).
' See Re, Judicial Independence and Accountability: The Judicial Councils Reform
and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 8 N. Ky. L. REv. 221, 256-57 (1981) [here-
inafter Re, Judicial Independence].
6 S. BALDWIN, THE AMERicAN JuDIcARY 376 (1905).
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constitutional government.
Many reasons may be stated for the increased number of per-
sons who resort to the courts for a vindication of their rights when
aggrieved by public officials or agencies of government. A letter of
complaint to a mayor, governor, or even the President, setting
forth a grievance against an official or administrative agency, may
result in a reply prepared by the agency itself. Improper adminis-
trative action results occasionally from venality or, more com-
monly, from incompetence or indifference. Often, in pursuing what
may be regarded as the broader governmental objective, an official
may transgress the statutory authority or the established lawful
procedure. Corrective legislative action is usually slow and cumber-
some. Thus, a brief, and yet accurate, answer to the question why
an aggrieved individual will resort to the courts is to be found in
the unique role of the judiciary in our society.
IV. UNIQUE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
Since the Act of Settlement of 1701, the judges have been as-
sured an enviable independence. In our Declaration of Indepen-
dence, a specific grievance against King George III pertained to the
removal of judges at the King's pleasure. As a consequence, in Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution we adopted the language of the Act of
Settlement, and federal judges hold office "during good behavior,"
removable only by impeachment. Beyond, and also in part as a
consequence of independence, we have developed a sense of consti-
tutionalism. Any law in contravention of the Constitution is null
and void.
This doctrine, enunciated for us in the case of Marbury v.
Madison" in 1803, followed the English tradition articulated in Sir
Edward Coke's famous dicta in Dr. Bonham's Case9 in 1610. This
case arose from an exclusive patent King Henry VII had given the
Royal College of Physicians to regulate the practice of medicine in
London, and which had been confirmed by Parliament. When Dr.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The Constitution states: "The Judges, both of the su-
preme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour ... ." Id.; see
Re, Judicial Independence, supra note 5, at 225 (federal judges may be removed from office
only through impeachment); see also Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 671 (1980) (stressing the importance of complete independence of the
judiciary).
8 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8 Co. Rep. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 647 (Common Pleas 1610).
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Thomas Bonham, a Doctor of Medicine of the University of Cam-
bridge, was imprisoned for practicing medicine without the Col-
lege's approval, he brought an action for false imprisonment
against the leaders of the College. Justice Coke set forth several
arguments denying the authority of the College over Dr. Bonham,
but it is his dicta in the case that has retained its vitality to the
present day. Justice Coke declared: "[T]he common law will con-
troul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be ut-
terly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the com-
mon law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void . . .,,"
This dicta never attained general acceptance under the Parliamen-
tary system in England. Nevertheless, its influence was felt in early
American cases in the state courts before the adoption of the Con-
stitution, and later served as the fundamental underpinning of
Marbury v. Madison.
Apparently, the first American case that nullified a legislative
act is the 1657 case of Browne v. Geedings,1  in which a court in
Salem struck down an act of a town meeting on the authority of
Dr. Bonham's Case. Other cases in pre-constitutional America fol-
lowed Lord Coke's dicta, but perhaps the most famous early case is
Trevett v. Weeden.12 In Trevett, a Rhode Island court struck down
as null and void an act of the State Assembly which required the
acceptance of paper money as legal tender. This decision is partic-
ularly significant in that it was handed down just one year before
the meeting of the Constitutional Convention, and was undoubt-
edly in the minds of at least some of the Framers at the
Convention.
In summary, under our constitutional system, it is for the
courts to say whether the laws of the legislature are constitutional,
and what the laws mean in their application to specific cases.
It is also within the judiciary's power to determine whether
any person has been deprived of any rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution. Hence, any person who alleges a deprivation of due pro-
cess or equal protection of the law may resort to the courts for
10 Id. at 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
"Unpublished opinion, mentioned in 2 RECORDS AND FIE OF THE QUARTERLY COURTS
OF ESSEX COUNTY, MASS. 1656-1662, at 47 (Essex Institute, Salem, Mass. 1912).
12 Unpublished opinion, Superior Court of Judicature-Court of Assise and General
Gaol Delivery (1786), discussed in C. HAmNsS, THE AlmmcAN DocTRm OF JUDICLAL
SuPREAcY 105-12 (2d ed. 1932).
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vindication of these constitutionally protected rights. In essence,
this is the function that assures a government of laws and the rule
of law.'" It is the unique role of the courts, a coequal branch of
government, to determine whether any person has been deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
V. VALIDITY AND MEANING OF LEGISLATION
The first duty of a court of the United States is to ensure that
the legislative enactment before it is in conformance with the Con-
stitution. The idea that all legislation must comply with the consti-
tutional mandate is perhaps best expressed by the following short
passage from Chief Justice Marshall's seminal opinion in Marbury
v. Madison: "It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the
constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it .
Chief Justice Marshall went on to explain:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide
on the operation of each.' 5
Thus, it has long been beyond doubt that we must defer to the
Constitution as the higher, or supreme, law.
It is important, however, to remember that the judicial func-
tion is not limited to passing upon the validity of statutes. As a
practical matter, courts are called upon more often to determine
the meaning, that is, the proper interpretation and application of
statutory enactments. Statutes are seldom, if ever, written so
clearly and comprehensively that there is no need to determine
their meaning in particular cases.'"
"s See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (no person, including the
President and his officers, is above the law); C.B.S. Imports Corp. v. United States, 450 F.
Supp. 724, 728 (Cust. Ct. 1978) ("all public officials [must] obey the mandates of the Consti-
tution"). Congressman Peter Rodino has stated: "Surely the reminder that ours is a govern-
ment of laws and not of men is always timely and cannot be overemphasized." Rodino, Book
Review, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 355, 357 (1977) (reviewing E. CORWIN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER
AND THE CONSTrrUTiON, ESSAYS (1976)).
"' 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
25 Id.
16 Re, International Trade Law and the Role of the Lawyer, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 363,
374 (1983) [hereinafter Re, International Trade Law]; see also Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S.
418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.) (the meaning of the language of a statute will "vary
greatly . . .according to the circumstances").
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The duty of interpreting and applying the law has long been
recognized to be an awesome responsibility. Indeed, in 1717, in a
sermon before the King, Bishop Hoadley declared: "Nay, whoever
hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws,
it is He who is truly the Law-Giver to all intents and purposes, and
not the person who first wrote or spoke them. ' 17 In more modern
times, Chief Justice Hughes expressed the same idea: "The Court
is the final interpreter of the Acts of Congress. Statutes come to
the judicial test... with respect to their true import, and a federal
statute finally means what the Court says it means."1 8
Of course, this does not mean that a court will ignore the will
of the legislature. Utilizing accepted principles of statutory inter-
pretation and application, courts must strive to give effect to the
intent of the legislature. This task is particularly difficult when sit-
uations are presented which the legislature did not anticipate. A
case for which there is no specific legislative direction may be re-
ferred to as a casus omissus, or an "unprovided-for-case." In such
cases, the court must fill the voids or lacunae in the statute.1 9 In
the words of Justice Holmes: "I recognize without hesitation that
judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only intersti-
tially .... 1"20 The guiding principle in such cases must always be
to effectuate the legislative intent that is expressed or implied in
the pertinent statute.
Under our system of checks and balances, the Constitution
serves as an instrument and symbol of restraint. While it vests
substantive powers in each branch of government, it also checks
and restrains the exercise of those powers to defined limits. As
Chief Justice Marshall emphasized in McCulloch v. Maryland,2 1
"[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding."22 The courts of the United States, as creatures of the
Constitution, stand as a symbol of the law's authority. It is the role
and duty of the courts to ensure that all officers of government
perform their duties in conformance with the Constitution and the
law.
127 Bishop Hoadley's sermon preached before the King on "The Nature of the Kingdom
or Church of Christ" (Mar. 31, 1717). See Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence, 6
HARv. L. REV. 21, 33 n.1 (1892).
, C. HUGHES, THE SuPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 229-32 (1928).
19 Re, International Trade Law, supra note 16, at 374.
20 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
21 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22 Id. at 407 (Marshall, C.J.).
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While it is recognized that a judge's total background and
qualities as a human being may sometimes influence his or her out-
look, justice must be administered impartially and according to es-
tablished precedents and principles of law. In Latin, this concept is
expressed by the maxim or principle, "[Njon debet esse sub
homine sed sub Deo et sub lege"-not under Man, but under God
and Law.23
A splendid example of this principle is the case of United
States v. Lee.24 The Lee case arose out of an action brought by the
son of General Robert E. Lee for the recovery of property of the
Lee family against the commandant of Fort Myer and the superin-
tendent of the national cemetery at Arlington. Justice Miller had
no difficulty in disposing of the argument that the court could not
proceed further "because it appear[ed] that certain military of-
ficers, acting under the orders of the President, [had] seized this
estate, and converted one part of it into a military fort and another
into a cemetery. ' 25 For Justice Miller there was no doubt that the
executive possessed no power to take private property without
complying with the constitutional mandate requiring due process
and just compensation. He declared: "Not only no such power is
given, but it is absolutely prohibited, both to the executive and the
legislative, to deprive any one of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, or to take private property without just
compensation. '26
In setting aside this unconstitutional action of the President,
Justice Miller expounded the fundamental premise of the rule of
law:
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law.
No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity.
All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest,
are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.
It is the only supreme power in our system of
government .... 1
To summarize, government officials and administrative officers
may not act in contravention of the authority lawfully delegated to
23 Re, The Roman Contribution, supra note 1, at 474.
24 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
25 Id. at 219.
26 Id. at 220.
27 Id.
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them by Congress or found in the Constitution itself.2"
VI. SETTING ASIDE UNLAWFUL AGENCY ACTION
If an administrative official or agency has acted beyond the
lawfully delegated authority, on judicial review, the administrative
action will be set aside as ultra vires. The following quotation from
a leading Supreme Court case is helpful: "When Congress passes
an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmen-
tal activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the
authority granted."29 Differently stated, the judicial function en-
forces or effectuates the constitutional and statutory limitations
set forth in the statutory grant of authority. Hence, judicial review
ensures that agencies act lawfully, and not beyond their lawfully
delegated authority.
The correlative of this principle is that if an enactment is law-
ful, and an agency acts within its delegated authority, the wisdom
of the statute is not before the court." The justiciable issue before
the court is one of legality or lawfulness, and not the wisdom of the
policy embodied in the legislative enactment.
Of course, it is fundamental under our constitutional system
that no officer or agency may transgress or violate the rights of any
person in contravention of the Constitution's guarantees.3 1 The
fifth and fourteenth amendments make it abundantly clear that no
officer or agency may deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law. These constitutional guarantees
include both substantive and procedural protections.3 2 Judicial re-
view serves to ensure that persons affected by agency action are
afforded these protections. For example, if a government agency
were to deprive a person of a property right, or refuse to grant
some benefit to which there is an entitlement, that person must
have an opportunity to be heard." The type of hearing to be re-
18 See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944); C.B.S. Imports Corp. v. United
States, 450 F. Supp. 724, 728 (Cust. Ct. 1978).
29 Stark, 321 U.S. at 309.
-o See City Lumber Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 340, 345 (Cust. Ct. 1970), a/Pd,
457 F.2d 991 (C.C.P.A. 1972). In examining actions by the Tariff Commission, the City
Lumber court stated: "There is inherent in judicial review the unspoken premise that the
wisdom of the congressional enactment is not before the court." Id.
31 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see also 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1982).
2 See K. DAvis, ADmimsTRATvE LAW TEXT §§ 1.01-1.02, at 1-4 (3d ed. 1972).
"2 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (1975) (students entitled to public edu-
1988]
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ceived is dependent on the right implicated by the agency action.3 4
Intimately related to the concept of due process is the guarantee of
equal protection of the law. An agency of government must treat
persons similarly situated in a similar manner.3 5 If an agency has
established procedures or guidelines in a certain area, it must fol-
low its own procedures or furnish a cogent explanation for
noncompliance.36
A crucial judicial function deals with the courts' mandate to
pass upon the validity of all agency actions and procedures. This
includes passing upon the validity of agency rules and regulations,
as well as adjudications. Enabling acts which establish agencies al-
most universally empower agencies to pass rules and regulations to
carry out their delegated powers. Those rules and regulations are
usually more voluminous than the statutory enactment. Once
again, it is the function of the court to determine whether these
rules and regulations properly fulfill and effectuate the legislative
purpose, or whether they go beyond the statute, and therefore,
may be set aside as ultra vires.a3
VII. CONTROL OF DISCRETIONARY POWER
Inscribed in stone above the entrance to the Department of
Justice building in Washington, D.C., is the inscription "Where law
ends, tyranny begins." A variation on this theme appropriate to
cation may not be denied such without notice and hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
266-68 (1970) (entitlement to welfare benefits allows recipient to have evidentiary hearing
prior to termination of such).
See Gorman v. University of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988). The process that is
due is measured by a flexible standard depending, inter alia, on the particular right in ques-
tion. See id.; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Eldridge, Justice Powell
noted that:
[T]he specific dictates of due process generally require[] consideration of three
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
11 See Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
36 See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959) ("If [agency action] is based on a
defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency,
that procedure must be scrupulously observed.") (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388-89 (1957).
3 See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
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the modern administrative state has been suggested: "Where law
ends, discretion begins."38
An important function of the courts in reviewing administra-
tive action is regulating the exercise of discretionary power. An en-
abling act typically delegates authority to administrative officers.
It is an important judicial function to ensure that the administra-
tive officers do not exceed the scope of their delegated authority.
Often, in an enabling act, the legislature provides for the discre-
tionary exercise of authority by the agency in furtherance of its
statutory duties. The expertise developed by the agency in its area
of jurisdiction, it is believed, justifies the delegation of discretion
in the performance of the agency's functions. The discretion af-
forded an agency, however, is never completely without limits.3 9
Providing discretionary authority to an administrative officer
allows an agency to receive the benefits of the officer's expertise,
and the agency is able to particularize its action or decision to suit
the needs of the specific situation. Aristotle, in his Ethics, spoke of
epieikeia, that is, the notion of equity from which our modern con-
ception of equity is derived. The essence of this Aristotelian con-
cept is the idea that justice should be done in the particular case.
The legislature may set forth a universal rule, but this rule may
not cover every pertinent situation, and may lead to an unjust re-
sult if applied strictly in certain instances. Thus, an exception to
the letter of the law or the general rule sometimes must be made in
order to achieve justice in the particular case. Although govern-
ment may hope to achieve "certainty, predictability and efficiency,
perhaps too great a price will have to be paid if it is to be attained
by sacrificing Aristotelian epieikeia, equitable discretion, the de-
mands of natural justice and good conscience. ' '40
The delegation of discretionary authority, however, is by no
means an abandonment of the rule of law. Of course, irrespective
of the degree of discretion granted in the statute, constitutional
guarantees may not be transgressed. In addition, the judiciary will
review discretionary action to determine whether discretion has
K. DAvis, DISCRETONARY JUSTICE 3 (1980).
9 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 409-13 (1971).
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1982), covers judicial review of ad-
ministrative action to prevent abuses of discretion. See id.
'0 E. RE, SELECaED EssAYs ON EQUITY xi (1955); see E. RE, FREEDOM'S
PROPHET-SELECTED WRrrINGS OF ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. 376, 386 (1981) (letter of Professor
Chafee to author).
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been abused, or whether a decision has been arbitrary, capricious,
or otherwise not in accordance with the law.4' The courts, however,
will generally accord the agency's interpretation of its governing
statute a considerable degree of deference. The requirement of ju-
dicial deference stems from the need for agency expertise and wis-
dom in fulfilling the policy objectives of the legislature.42
VIII. PRINCIPLED ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING
Judicial review serves to ensure principled decision making at
the administrative level through a variety of devices. First, the re-
viewing court ensures that the agency takes into account all lawful,
relevant, and probative factors in making an administrative deter-
mination. Conversely, the reviewing court must ensure that the
agency did not consider any impermissible factors in making its
decision.
Judicial review, in all cases, results in casting light on the
manner in which agencies carry out or perform their delegated re-
sponsibilities. Judicial scrutiny of an administrative decision brings
to the surface an agency's perception and view of its own function,
and serves to illuminate the precise manner in which agencies go
about fulfilling their statutory duties.
Another beneficial function performed by the courts on judi-
cial review is to help ensure fairness. Many decisions can be found
in which the courts have set aside the administrative action, and,
on remand, have ordered administrative reconsideration, because
the agency procedures were either unfair or unfairly applied. These
are cases in which the parties may be said to have been deprived of
basic fairness or procedural due process.43 Even in cases in which
the statute expressly delegates discretionary power, the courts will
nonetheless, on judicial review, determine whether that discretion-
ary power has been abused.
An essential element of fairness is the requirement that the
41 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); see also Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 398 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (court properly reviewed agency action).
42 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
863-64 (1984) (agency interpretation entitled to deference even though it has changed over
time; change necessary to fulfill policy objectives); Caiola, 851 F.2d at 399 (when regulation
written and interpreted by several different agencies, the deference normally afforded such
regulations is not applicable).
"I See Caiola, 851 F.2d at 400-01.
[Vol. 62:601
ENFORCEMENT OF RULE OF LAW
agency articulate its reasons for a given action."' An agency's state-
ment of the reasons for its decision or action serves at least four
important functions. First, it requires that the agency focus its rea-
soning, and ensures that the decision is based on sound and ar-
ticulable grounds. Second, it provides the parties or those directly
affected by the administrative action with a clear explanation of
the agency's reasoning and enables them to see that their point of
view was fairly considered. Third, it enables the reviewing court to
determine whether the agency acted "in accordance with law," and
whether all relevant factors were considered. Fourth, it provides
guidance to those who potentially may be affected by agency ac-
tion, and permits them to structure or conduct their affairs in con-
formity to the agency's standards.45 If an agency's statement of
reasons is inadequate for these purposes, the courts will not hesi-
tate to remand to the agency for a statement that fulfills the statu-
tory requirement.
In cases of delegated discretionary authority, judicial review
may also check cases of gross incompetence, and cases in which
improper motives or impermissible factors may have played a part
in the administrative decision. Hence, in these cases judicial review
serves the beneficial purpose of checking extremes of arbitrariness,
as well as incompetence, or what may be termed administrative or
bureaucratic indifference.46
IX. SUMMARY OF BENEFITS OF JUDICIAL REvmw
Under our system, judicial review performs many beneficial
functions. In summary, the following benefits may be enumerated.
The reviewing court determines the constitutional validity of the
enabling act, and the delegation of authority to an administrative
44 See, e.g., Gorman v. University of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (Ist Cir. 1988) (public univer-
sity student entitled to reasons for school's disciplinary action); Freeman v. Rideout, 808
F.2d 949, 952-54 (2d Cir. 1986) (prison must provide reasons for denying prisoner right to
confrontation in disciplinary action), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1273 (1988).
5 R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKuIL, ADmImSTRATIvE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.2, at 221-
23 (1985). The authors propose the following five reasons why procedural safeguards act as a
check on administrative agency discretion: first, they restrict the agency to its statutory
authority; second, they increase efficiency in agency problem solving techniques; third, they
enhance agency accountability; fourth, they reduce political patronage within agencies; and
fifth, they enhance public acceptance of governmental actions. See id.
46 See Katunich v. Donovan, 576 F. Supp. 636 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). In reviewing a
denial of certain benefits by the Department of Labor, the court ordered the Labor Depart-
ment to make available certain confidential information to those plaintiffs deprived of the
benefits. See id. at 637-39.
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official or agency. The reviewing court determines the meaning of
statutes through the interpretation and application of the perti-
nent legislative enactments. In interpreting an enabling act and re-
lated statutes, the court, of necessity, must also fill all omissions or
voids in the statute.
In addition to statutory interpretation and application, a court
on judicial review determines the validity and meaning of rules,
regulations, and policy statements promulgated by the administra-
tive agency. By ensuring that administrative agencies comply with
established policies and procedures, and furnish reasonable expla-
nations of their actions, judicial review fosters the consistent and
equitable application of law.41 Courts, then, are able to check ex-
tremes of arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, gross incompetence,
and bureaucratic indifference. Thus, courts may be said to ensure
and promote the basic fairness of the administrative process.
A final benefit of judicial review may not be as readily appar-
ent, but is no less important to our society. The judicial opinion
memorializes the law and is a primary source and repository of the
law. The courts serve to give life and vitality to the words of the
Constitution. By enforcing and giving effect to constitutional guar-
antees, the courts promote and preserve a lawful society.
In his landmark work, Democracy in America, Alexis de Toc-
queville devoted special treatment to the "Federal Courts of Jus-
tice," and his comments about the role of the judiciary in America
are especially pertinent today. He expressed great respect and ad-
miration for the American judicial system and perceived the im-
portance of its role in our constitutional system. He wrote:
Few laws can escape the searching analysis of the judicial power
for any length of time, for there are few which are not prejudicial
to some private interest or other, and none which may not be
brought before a court of justice by the choice of parties, or by
the necessity of the case.48
This observation underscores the breadth of the influence the judi-
ciary must have over our society. With the cases presented to
them, the judicial branch must determine at some time the lawful-
ness of nearly all governmental action. Moreover, since the courts
reach back into the Constitution as the basis for their decisions,
"' See Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
48 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 101-02 (P. Bradley trans. 1963) (3d ed.
1850).
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they must, of necessity, take a historical perspective as to the oper-
ations of government. Thus, although courts are limited to decid-
ing cases properly presented to them for adjudication, the impor-
tance of the courts extends far beyond the interests or parochial
concerns of the parties before them.
Many years before his appointment to the Supreme Court,
Justice Cardozo, with characteristic eloquence, stated that the
"chief worth" of the judiciary is not manifested in the few cases
"in which the legislature has gone beyond the lines that mark the
limits of discretion," but rather, "in making vocal and audible the
ideals that might otherwise be silenced, in giving them continuity
of life and expression. '49
The words of Justice Frankfurter, also written before his ap-
pointment to the Court, are equally significant:
The Supreme Court is indispensable to the effective workings
of our federal government. If it did not exist, we should have to
create it. I know of no other peaceful method for making the ad-
justments necessary to a society like ours-for maintaining the
equilibrium between state and federal power, for settling the eter-
nal conflicts between liberty and authority-than through a court
of great traditions free from the tensions and temptations of
party strife, detached from the fleeting interests of the moment.
But because, inextricably, the Supreme Court is also an organ of
statesmanship and the most powerful organ, it must have a sea-
soned understanding of affairs, the imagination to see the organic
relations of society, above all, the humility not to set up its own
judgment against the conscientious efforts of those whose primary
duty it is to govern. 0
The relationship of administrative officials and administrative
agencies, and the courts, must be one of mutual respect. Each must
appreciate and understand the powers, responsibilities, limitations,
and special duties of the other. Each has important constitutional
functions in a federal system founded upon the separation of pow-
ers and the rule of law. In matters of expertise, and in areas in
which agencies daily deal with problems within their special fields
of competence, a degree of judicial deference to the administrative
action is not only justified, but is also warranted and required.
Nevertheless, it must be added that, without the beneficial
4, B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 92-94 (1921).
50 F. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLrIcs 52-53 (A. MacLeish & E. Prichard, Jr. eds.
1939).
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scrutiny of judicial review, government officials may on occasion
forget that all public servants are duty bound to obey the law, and
protect the rights of the persons whom they are to serve. By sub-
jecting administrative action to the careful scrutiny of the courts,
we help preserve and achieve a lawful society consistent with the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of
the law.
X. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we may ask: "What, then, is required of all pub-
lic servants, who serve the people under the law?" A thoughtful
answer brings to mind the reading from the Old Testament in
which the Lord appeared to Solomon in a dream and said: "Ask
what thou wilt that I should give thee," and Solomon said: "Give
therefore to thy servant an understanding heart, to judge thy peo-
ple, and discern between good and evil." Since the word was pleas-
ing to the Lord, that Solomon asked for wisdom to discern judg-
ment, Solomon was given "a wise and understanding heart."51
In a finite world of frail human beings, it is too much to expect
that public officials possess the wisdom of a Solomon in the per-
formance of their duties. Surely, most citizens would welcome and
be satisfied with "a wise and understanding heart." All citizens,
however, may properly expect that public officials act lawfully,
within the bounds of law, and serve to secure, not deny or violate,
the fundamental rights of the persons whom they have sworn to
serve, to the best of their ability, and under the law.
51 3 Kings 3:5-12.
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